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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Following a jury trial, forty-five-year-old Michael Lynn Johnson was found guilty of 
felony possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. The district court 
imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with three years fixed. 
On appeal, Mr. Johnson asserts that the district court committed reversible error 
when it denied his motion for a mistrial, because the prosecutor used his codefendant's 
invocation of the right to remain silent to indirectly comment on his silence and thereby 
have the jury infer his guilt. He also asserts that the district court abused its discretion 
when it imposed the sentence. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Boise Police Department officers served a search warrant regarding controlled 
substances at 4219 W. Bethel Street in Boise. (Presentence Investigation Report 
(hereinafter, PSI), pp.2, 15, Reporter's Transcript of Jury Trial Days 1-3, Mar. 26-28, 
2012 (hereinafter, Tr.), p.150, Ls.20-22.) Mr. Johnson's employer owned the house. 
(PSI, p.2.) After nobody answered at the front door, the officers entered the house by 
using a battering ram to break down the door. (PSI, pp.2, 15.) The officers found 
Amber Leonard inside the house and Jacob Lee just outside the house in the backyard. 
(PSI, pp.2, 15.) Both Ms. Leonard and Mr. Lee were handcuffed by the officers. (PSI, 
pp.2.) After Ms. Leonard was handcuffed and secured, Officer Will Reimers read her 
Miranda1 rights to her, and she asserted her right to remain silent. (PSI, p.15, 
Tr., p.383, L.2 - p.385, L.2.) Officer Reimers then handed her over to Lieutenant Paul 
1 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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Burch, who was a sergeant at the time of the search. (PSI, p. 15, Tr., p.394, Ls.11-18.) 
Lieutenant Burch later inteNiewed Ms. Leonard, and she waived her Miranda rights and 
admitted that she had a purple methamphetamine pipe in her bedroom and marijuana 
on her person. (PSI, p.16; see Tr., p.140, Ls.17-20.) 
In Mr. Johnson's bedroom, the officers found pieces of mail with Mr. Johnson's 
name on them, a small amount of a white powdery substance, and several 
methamphetamine pipes in plain view. (PSI, pp.2, 14-15, Tr., p.154, L.10 - p.160, 
L.24.) In the garage, the officers found a safe. (PSI, p.2.) After the officers opened the 
safe with the assistance of firefighters, they found a black nylon zipper bag containing 
$380.00 and six baggies of a crystal substance that appeared to be methamphetamine. 
(PSI, pp.2, 15-16.) Also inside the safe was a small blue plastic container that held a 
white crystal substance consistent with methamphetamine and another bag of a white 
crystal substance consistent with methamphetamine. (PSI, p.16.) In total, the 
suspected methamphetamine in the eight containers had a package weight of 
approximately 25.6 grams. (PSI, p.16.) 
The safe also contained clean plastic zip-top baggies, a small digital scale, and 
two bags containing a total of about 1.8 grams of suspected marijuana. (PSI, p.16.) 
Additionally, the officers found Mr. Johnson's birth certificate, his Social Security card, 
his certificate of title for a vehicle, and a credit card with his name on it inside the safe. 
(PSI, pp.2, 16, Tr., p.391, L.18 - p.392, L.19.) According to Officer Reimers's police 
report, "There were no items of indicia2 belonging to any other person in the safe." 
2 An "item of indicia," according to Officer Guy Bourgeau, "is something that identifies 
you by virtue of your name. So mail coming to your house would be indicia. It would be 
indicative that you live there. It has your name and home address, so we refer to it as 
'indicia."' (Tr., p.159, Ls.13-19.) 
2 
(PSI, p.16.) However, the officers did not test the contents of the safe (or, for that 
matter, anything in the house) for fingerprints. (Tr., p.416, Ls.11-14.) Officer Reimers 
testified at trial that the officers did not test the contents of the safe for fingerprints 
because "when you have a locked safe with only one person's indicia in it along with 
evidence, there is no need to waste the taxpayers' money." (Tr., p.416, Ls.15-19.) 
Mr. Johnson was at work when the officers served the search warrant and 
conducted their search. (See PSI, p.2.) Officers went to Mr. Johnson's workplace and 
arrested him there. (PSI, p.2.) They then brought Mr. Johnson to the house. (PSI, 
p.2.) Mr. Johnson reportedly admitted that the safe belonged to him, and stated that he 
had forgotten the combination. (PSI, p.17.) After Officer Reimers told Mr. Johnson that 
the officers had found bags of suspected methamphetamine in the safe, Mr. Johnson 
stated that he did not want to talk to Officer Reimers about what was found in the safe, 
and that he wanted to talk to his lawyer. (PSI, p.18.) 
The white powdery substance found in Mr. Johnson's bedroom tested 
presumptively positive for amphetamine. (PSI, p.14.) Additionally, samples from each 
of the containers of crystal substance found in the safe all tested presumptively positive 
for amphetamine. (PSI, p.16.) The suspected marijuana from the safe tested 
presumptively positive for marijuana. (PSI, p.16.) 
Mr. Johnson was charged with one count of possession of a controlled substance 
with the intent to deliver, felony, Idaho Code § 37-2732(a), one count of possession of 
drug paraphernalia, misdemeanor, I.C. § 37-2734A, and one count of possession of a 
controlled substance, misdemeanor, I.C. § 37-2732(c).3 (R., pp.7-8, 33-36.) He 
3 The felony possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver charge was 
for the methamphetamine, and the misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance 
charge was for the marijuana. (R., p.36.) 
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entered a not guilty plea to the charges. (R., p.39.) Mr. Johnson and his codefendant, 
Ms. Leonard, had a joint jury trial. (See R., p.60.) After the prosecutor made comments 
in his opening statement about Mr. Johnson's assertion of his right to counsel, the 
district court granted a mistrial for both Mr. Johnson and Ms. Leonard. (R., pp.61-62.) 
Mr. Johnson and Ms. Leonard were subsequently codefendants in a new joint 
jury trial. (See R., p.69.) Mr. Johnson did not testify at the trial, while Ms. Leonard 
testified during the defense case-in-chief. (R., p.74.) After the prosecution played a 
recording during the State's rebuttal that indicated that Ms. Leonard had invoked her 
right to remain silent, Ms. Leonard and Mr. Johnson asked for the district court to 
declare another mistrial. (Tr., p.515, L.13 - p.517, L.6, p.531, L.22 - p.532, L.9.) The 
district court denied the codefendants' motion for a mistral. (Tr., p.548, L.4 - p.549, 
L.24.) The jury subsequently found Mr. Johnson guilty on all three counts. (R., p.124.) 
At sentencing, the State recommended a unified sentence of fifteen years, with 
five years fixed. (Reporter's Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, May 16, 2012 
(hereinafter, Sentencing Tr.), p.7, Ls.15-19.) Mr. Johnson's counsel recommended that 
the district court place Mr. Johnson on a Therapeutic Community "rider," or otherwise 
impose a lower fixed sentence than that recommended by the State, such as one or two 
years fixed. (Sentencing Tr., p.12, L.23 - p.24, L.12.) The district court, for the felony 
possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver count, imposed a unified 
sentence of fifteen years, with three years fixed.4 (R., pp.127-30.) 
Mr. Johnson then filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.134-37.) 
4 The district court imposed a sentence of sixty-six days in jail for each of the other two 
counts, to run concurrently with the felony sentence. (R., p.128.) The district court 
gave Mr. Johnson sixty-six days credit for time served. (R., pp.128-29.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court commit reversible error when it denied Mr. Johnson's motion 
for a mistrial? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of 
fifteen years, with three years fixed, upon Mr. Johnson following his conviction for 
felony possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Committed Reversible Error When It Denied Mr. Johnson's Motion 
For A Mistrial 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Johnson asserts that the district court committed reversible error when it 
denied his motion for a mistrial. The prosecutor committed misconduct by playing 
during the State's rebuttal a recording of Lieutenant Burch stating that Mr. Johnson's 
codefendant Ms. Leonard had invoked her right to remain silent, to indirectly comment 
on Mr. Johnson's own invocation of his right to remain silent and thereby have the jury 
infer his guilt. The State will be unable to demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
the prosecutorial misconduct was harmless. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 29.1, a criminal defendant's motion for a mistrial 
may be granted "when there occurs during the trial an error or legal defect in the 
proceedings ... which is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the defendant of a 
fair trial." I.C.R. 29.1 (a). "Where a defendant alleges error at trial that he had 
contemporaneously objected to," an appellate court "reviews the error on appeal under 
the harmless error test." State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 59 (2011) (citing State v. 
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010)). "When the alleged error is prosecutorial 
misconduct, first the defendant must demonstrate that prosecutorial misconduct 
occurred, and then the [appellate court] must declare a belief beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the misconduct did not contribute to the jury's verdict, in order to find that the 
error was harmless and not reversible." Id. (citing Perry, 150 Idaho at 227-28). The 
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State "has the burden of demonstrating to the appellate court beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the constitutional violation did not contribute to the jury's verdict." Perry, 150 
Idaho at 227. 
Here, Mr. Johnson's counsel contemporaneously objected to the prosecutor's 
comments as prosecutorial misconduct and made a motion for mistrial based upon that 
objection. (Tr., p.531, L.22 - p.532, L.9.) Thus, this Court should determine 
(1) whether there was any prosecutorial misconduct, and (2) if so, whether the error 
was harmless. 
C. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct By Using The Statement Regarding 
Ms. Leonard's Invocation Of The Right To Remain Silent To Indirectly Comment 
On Mr. Johnson's Own Silence And Thereby Have The Jury Infer His Guilt 
Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution 
and Article I, section 13 of the Idaho Constitution, no criminal defendant may be 
compelled to testify against himself or herself. U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV, Idaho 
Const. art. I,§ 13. Thus, suspects in criminal cases have a constitutional right to remain 
silent. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-69 (1966) (holding that, under certain 
circumstances, a criminal suspect must "be informed in clear and unequivocal terms 
that he has the right to remain silent"). 
Further, this right bars the prosecution from commenting on a defendant's post-
Miranda invocation of the right to remain silent. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-
19 (1976), Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613-14 (1965). As the Idaho Supreme 
Court has recognized, "because of the promise present in a Miranda warning, a 
prosecutor may not use evidence of post-arrest, post-Miranda silence for either 
impeachment, Doyle v. Ohio, [426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976)], or as substantive evidence of 
guilt in the State's case-in chief, Wainwright v. Greenfield, [474 U.S. 284, 292 (1986)]." 
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Ellington, 151 Idaho at 60. Representatives of the State, such as police officers, have 
the same duty as prosecutors not to improperly comment on a defendant's silence. Id. 
at 61. However, "(a] prosecutor may use evidence of pre-Miranda silence, either pre- or 
post-arrest, for impeachment of the defendant." Id. at 60. 
Thus, Idaho's appellate courts have consistently held that a prosecutor commits 
misconduct by commenting on a defendant's post-Miranda silence, because such 
comments run the risk that the jury will infer the defendant's guilt from his or her 
exercise of the constitutional right to remain silent. E.g., State v. Parton, 154 Idaho 558, 
_, 300 P.3d 1046, 1055-56 (2013) (holding that a prosecutor violated a defendant's 
Fifth Amendment rights by commenting on the defendant's post-Miranda silence during 
the prosecutor's closing argument), Ellington, 151 Idaho at 59-61 (holding that a 
prosecutor committed misconduct by commenting on a defendant's post-arrest silence 
through the questioning of a detective witness during the State's case-in-chief), State v. 
Molen, 148 Idaho 950, 960 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding that a prosecutor's question to a 
defendant during cross-examination as whether the defendant "waited until you got your 
chance here to listen to all the witnesses and then tell your story" violated the 
defendant's right to remain silent). 
Mr. Johnson submits that the prosecutor here also committed misconduct by 
commenting on a defendant's post-Miranda silence. Following Ms. Leonard's testimony 
for the defense at the trial, the prosecutor proposed playing during the State's rebuttal a 
redacted audio recording of Ms. Leonard's interview with Lieutenant Burch. (Tr., p.481, 
L.12 - p.482, L.10.) After Lieutenant Burch laid foundation for the recording, the 
prosecution published the recording to the jury. (Tr., p.511, L.8 - p.514, L.14.) The 
recording included the following exchange: 
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[LIEUTENANT BURCH:] Here is the thing: The charges that you are 
looking at only - I mean, there's a meth pipe back in your room. There is 
some weed out in the garage and paraphernalia everywhere. You talked 
to Officer Reimers. Okay. I would rather not charge you with a bunch of 
stuff that isn't really - that's yours. And I know you said to him that you 
didn't want to answer questions. I think you're straight-up enough -
AMBER LEONARD: Right. 
[LIEUTENANT BURCH:] - I would like to ask you what's yours and what's 
not yours. 
(Tr., p. 515, L. 13 - p. 516, L. 1 . ) 
Ms. Leonard's counsel immediately asked to pause the recording and, outside 
the presence of the jury, requested a mistrial on the grounds of prosecutorial 
misconduct. (Tr., p.516, L.2 - p.517, L.6.) The prosecutor responded to Ms. Leonard's 
motion for a mistrial by arguing that Ms. Leonard had voluntarily made statements to 
Lieutenant Burch after being given her Miranda rights and re-approached. (Tr., p.524, 
L.7 - p.526, L.21.) The district court determined that the comments regarding 
Ms. Leonard's assertion of the right to remain silent were not being used as evidence of 
guilt, and that Ms. Leonard had waived her right to remain silent by testifying at trial and 
thus opened her testimony to impeachment. (Tr., p.528, L.25 - p.529, L.20.) The 
district court therefore denied the motion for a mistrial. (Tr., p.529, Ls.19-20.) 
Mr. Johnson's counsel then informed the district court that he wanted to join the 
motion for a mistrial. (Tr., p.531, Ls.22-24.) Counsel for Mr. Johnson believed that "an 
undue prejudice" had also arisen towards Mr. Johnson, because "Ms. Leonard has 
testified as to facts that relate directly to Mr. Johnson." (Tr., p.531, L.24 - p.532, L.3.) 
Mr. Johnson's counsel was concerned "that somehow is [Ms. Leonard's] silence now 
going to be imputed to my client. The issue that we have here is I have got - my client 
has asserted his right to remain silent." (Tr., p.532, Ls.4-9.) 
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The district court stated that it planned to instruct the prosecutor "not to make any 
reference to the fact that the search warrant was issued by a judge upon probable 
cause in front of the jury, not to make any comment about this part of the tape at all in 
front of the jury." (Tr., p.534, L.23 - p.535, L.4.) The district court also asked counsel 
for the defendants "not to make any comment about this particular part of the tape in 
front of the jury." (Tr., p.535, Ls.5-7.) Before taking a recess, the district court asked 
the prosecutor to redact the part of the recording commenting on Ms. Leonard's 
assertion of the right to remain silent, remarking, "And as I said before, frankly, I'm 
amazed that you left it in there, knowing the history of this case." (Tr., p.535, Ls.19-23.) 
After the recess, Mr. Johnson's counsel told the court, "So my client is now left 
with exercising his right to remain silent because we have rested. There is testimony in 
the record that infers guilt from exercising your right to remain silent. So we are in a 
position where I do believe that it is prejudicial." (Tr., p.543, Ls.1-6.) In response, the 
district court advised that it would "tell the jury [in the instructions] that you've got a right 
to remain silent, and they can't draw any negative inference from the fact that one does 
remain silent. And I think that probably takes care of it for Mr. Johnson's case because 
there has actually been no comment by anybody about him remaining silent." 
(Tr., p.543, Ls.7-14.) The district court additionally stated that Ms. Leonard's issue was 
different, and that "she clearly has waived her right to remain silent by testifying here." 
(Tr., p.543, Ls.15-17.) 
After further argument from counsel, the district court commented that "I don't 
know why this wasn't redacted, and I haven't heard any reason for it." (Tr., p.548, 
Ls.11-12.) However, the district court also did not "think this discussion is relevant. And 
I am intending to give the instruction to the jury that they can't draw any inference 
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regarding that." (Tr., p.548, Ls.13-17.) The district court stated, "I'm not convinced that 
the jury is going to even pay any attention to it in the way it came up in this case." 
(Tr., p.548, Ls.20-22.) "[T]his is being played as rebuttal for Ms. Leonard's testimony 
here in court. And what the concern is, with the comments on the Defendants' silence, 
is that the jury will conclude that they're guilty. That's a tough case to make where the 
defendant [Ms. Leonard] has voluntarily testified at trial." (Tr., p.548, L.25 - p.549, L.6.) 
While the district court understood "that the rights of the defendants are very 
significant," it thought "that any chance of prejudice is so slight, that it really does not 
deserve the granting of a mistrial and teeing this up all over again." (Tr., p.549, Ls.15-
20.) Thus, the district court ultimately denied the motion for a mistrial. (Tr., p.549, 
L.21.) As part of the written jury instructions, the district court instructed the jury as 
follows: "You must not draw any inference of guilt from the fact that the defendant does 
not testify, nor should this fact be discussed by you or enter into your deliberations in 
any way." (R., p.115; see Tr., p.663, Ls.9-17.) 
Mr. Johnson asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct by using 
Lieutenant Burch's statement regarding Ms. Leonard's invocation of the right to remain 
silent to indirectly comment on Mr. Johnson's own silence and thereby have the jury 
infer his guilt. As a preliminary matter, the prosecutor was not permitted to comment on 
Ms. Leonard's post-arrest, post-Miranda silence. While the district court stated that it 
did not remember whether Officer Reimers testified that he had given Ms. Leonard her 
Miranda rights before Lieutenant Burch interviewed her (Tr., p.530, Ls.21-23), Officer 
Reimers actually read Ms. Leonard her Miranda rights before the interview (Tr., p.309, 
Ls.8-10, p.384, L.25 - p.385, L.2, p.394, Ls.11-18). 
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Thus, the prosecutor was not permitted to introduce Lieutenant Burch's 
statement on Ms. Leonard's silence during the State's rebuttal, because her silence was 
post-arrest and post-Miranda. Mr. Johnson submits that, just as "a prosecutor may not 
use evidence of post-arrest, post-Miranda silence for either impeachment, or as 
substantive evidence of guilt in the State's case-in chief," Ellington, 151 Idaho at 60 
(citations omitted), or in the State's closing argument, Parton, 154 Idaho 558, a 
prosecutor may not use such evidence during the State's rebuttal. The constitutional 
protection barring the prosecutor from using such comments applies during the State's 
rebuttal, because comments on a defendant's post-Miranda silence also run the risk 
that the jury will infer the defendant's guilt from his or her exercise of the constitutional 
right to remain silent. The prosecutor here was therefore not permitted to use evidence 
of Ms. Leonard's post-arrest, post-Miranda silence for impeachment purposes or as 
substantive evidence of guilt. 5 Because the prosecutor was not permitted to use 
Lieutenant Burch's statement regarding Ms. Leonard's silence, the prosecutor 
committed misconduct. 
Additionally, the district court incorrectly denied the motion for a mistrial, in part, 
because it determined that Ms. Leonard "has clearly waived her right to silence by 
testifying here at this trial." (Tr., p.529, Ls.16-18, p.543, Ls.15-17.) However, Idaho's 
appellate courts have held that a prosecutor commits misconduct through commenting 
on a defendant's post-Miranda silence even in cases where the defendant testified at 
5 Even if Ms. Leonard's silence had been pre-Miranda, the Idaho Supreme Court "has 
held that a defendant's right to remain silent attaches upon custody, not arrest or 
interrogation, and thus a prosecutor may not use any post-custody silence to infer guilt 
in its case-in-chief." Ellington, 151 Idaho at 60. Thus, if Ms. Leonard's silence had 
been pre-Miranda, the prosecutor would have been permitted to use her silence only for 
impeachment. See id. 
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trial. See, e.g., State v. Strouse, 133 Idaho 709, 711-14 (1999) (holding that a 
prosecutor improperly used a defendant's post-Miranda silence during cross-
examination and closing argument in violation of the defendant's Fifth Amendment right 
to remain silent), Molen, 148 Idaho at 958, 960. No authority supports the district 
court's conclusion that a defendant, by testifying at trial, gives up the constitutional 
protection barring a prosecutor from using the defendant's post-Miranda silence. See 
Doyle, 426 U.S. at 613-14, 619-20. Thus, the district court's determination that the 
prosecutor could use evidence of Ms. Leonard's post-Miranda silence because she had 
testified in her defense was incorrect. 
The prosecutor's misconduct in using Lieutenant Burch's statement was 
compounded by the fact that the statement's only conceivable use against Ms. Leonard 
was as substantive evidence of her guilt. A criminal defendant who voluntarily testifies 
in his or her own behalf puts his credibility in issue, and is subject to impeachment the 
same as any other witness. State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 688 (1976). A witness 
may be impeached by showing that on a prior occasion the witness made a statement 
inconsistent with testimony he or she gave at trial. Id. Here, Ms. Leonard testified at 
trial that she did not tell the officers that the purple methamphetamine pipe belonged to 
her (Tr., p.467, Ls.5-8, p.476, Ls.6-13), and that she knew that Mr. Lee had placed the 
black zipper bag in the safe (Tr., p.461, L.17 - p.462, L.5). The recording of the 
interview included statements by Ms. Leonard that were inconsistent with her testimony 
about the purple methamphetamine pipe (Tr., p.646, Ls.4-21), and about her knowledge 
of the contents of the safe (Tr., p.640, Ls.9-21). 
However, Lieutenant Burch's statement regarding Ms. Leonard's invocation of 
the right to remain silent was not inconsistent with any of Ms. Leonard's trial testimony. 
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Because Lieutenant Burch's statement was not inconsistent with Ms. Leonard's 
testimony, it could not have been used for impeachment purposes. See Drapeau, 97 
Idaho at 688. Indeed, the district court indicated that Lieutenant Burch's statement was 
not being used for impeachment purposes at during the discussion. When the district 
court initially denied Ms. Leonard's motion for a mistrial, it observed, "I don't think the 
evidence here is really being used for anything."6 (Tr., p.529, Ls.6-7.) The district court 
later stated, "I'm not sure this particular statement is part of the impeachment." 
(Tr., p.531, Ls.15-16.) Thus, the only conceivable use of Lieutenant's Burch's 
statement against Ms. Leonard was as substantive evidence of her guilt. 
In light of the above, Mr. Johnson asserts that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct by using Lieutenant Burch's statement regarding Ms. Leonard's invocation 
of the right to remain silent to indirectly comment on Mr. Johnson's own silence and 
thereby have the jury infer his guilt. While the district court remarked that "there has 
actually been no comment by anybody about [Mr. Johnson] remaining silent" (Tr., p.543, 
Ls.13-14), Mr. Johnson's counsel was concerned that Ms. Johnson's silence "would 
somehow be imputed to my client" (Tr., p.532, Ls.4-7). Additionally, Mr. Johnson did 
not testify at the trial, and so did not open the door for impeachment by the prosecution. 
See Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 688. With impeachment not an option, the prosecutor's 
indirect comment on Mr. Johnson's assertion of the right to remain silent implied that 
Mr. Johnson was guilty. Because Lieutenant Burch's statement could only conceivably 
6 The district court also stated, "I don't think the statement that's been objected to on 
this tape is being used as evidence of guilt." (Tr., p.529, Ls.8-10.) However, the district 
court seemingly ignored the Idaho appellate cases holding that comments such as 
Lieutenant Burch's statement constitute misconduct because they run the risk that the 
jury will infer the defendant's guilt from his or her exercise of the constitutional right to 
remain silent. See, e.g., Parton, 154 Idaho 558, 300 P.3d at 1055-56, Ellington, 151 
Idaho at 59-61, Molen, 148 Idaho at 960. 
14 
have been used against Ms. Leonard as substantive evidence of her guilt, it follows that 
the evidence of Ms. Leonard's assertion of the right to remain silent would imply that 
Ms. Leonard was guilty and transfer that guilt to Mr. Johnson. See People v. Cole, 584 
P.2d 71, 73 (Colo. 1978) ("A danger inherent in permitting the prosecutor to impeach a 
witness allegedly involved in the same criminal transaction as the defendant with his 
post-arrest silence is that the jury will infer guilt on the part of the witness and transfer 
that guilt to the defendant.") Thus, the prosecutor committed misconduct by indirectly 
commenting on Mr. Johnson's silence to imply that he was guilty. 
D. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Here Was Not Harmless Error, Because The State 
Will Be Unable To Demonstrate, Beyond A Reasonable Doubt, That The 
Prosecutorial Misconduct Did Not Contribute To The Jury's Guilty Verdict 
Mr. Johnson asserts that the prosecutorial misconduct here was not harmless 
error because the State will be unable to demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
the misconduct did not contribute to the jury's guilty verdict. As discussed above, if the 
defendant demonstrates that prosecutorial misconduct occurred, the appellate court 
"must declare a belief beyond a reasonable doubt that the misconduct did not contribute 
to the jury's verdict, in order to find that the error was harmless and not reversible." 
Ellington, 151 Idaho at 59 (citing Perry, 150 Idaho at 227-28). The State has the burden 
of demonstrating, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the misconduct did not contribute to 
the jury's verdict. Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. 
Here, the State will be unable to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
prosecutorial misconduct did not contribute to the jury's verdict. While the district court 
stated, "I'm not convinced that the jury is going to even pay any attention to it in the way 
it came up in this case" (Tr., p.548, Ls.20-22), the facts of this case show the impact of 
Lieutenant Burch's statement. This is not a case where the prosecution presented 
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overwhelming evidence of Mr. Johnson's guilt. Although Mr. Johnson told the officers 
that the safe was his, and Mr. Johnson's items of indicia were found in the safe, that 
evidence does not establish Mr. Johnson's guilt. No fingerprint evidence connected 
Mr. Johnson to the methamphetamine found in the safe. In fact, the officers utterly 
failed to test anything in the safe or in the house for fingerprints, ostensibly to save 
money. (Tr., p.416, Ls.11-19.) Additionally, Ms. Leonard testified that Mr. Lee had 
"regular access" to the safe (Tr., p.457, L.16 - p.458, L.1 ), and that he placed the black 
zipper bag in the safe (Tr., p.461, L.17 - p.462, l.5). The above facts highlight the 
overall weakness of the evidence against Mr. Johnson. Thus, the prosecutor's indirect 
comment on Mr. Johnson's assertion of the right to remain silent, as evidence of his 
substantive guilt, likely contributed to the jury's guilty verdict. 
Further, Mr. Johnson asserts that the district court's curative instruction was 
insufficient. While appellate courts "normally presume that a jury will follow an 
instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence, this presumption cannot shield all errors 
from appellate review, regardless of the severity of the error or the forcefulness and 
effectiveness of the instruction." State v. Watkins, 152 Idaho 764, 768 (Ct. App. 2012). 
"[W]here the evidence presents a close question for the jury, a corrective instruction, 
even one that is forceful, might be insufficient to cure the prejudicial effect of very 
damaging evidence." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
As discussed above, the written jury instructions included the following 
instruction: 
A defendant in a criminal trial has a constitutional right not to be compelled 
to testify. The decision whether to testify is left to the defendant, acting 
with the advice and assistance of the defendant's lawyer. You must not 
draw any inference of guilt from the fact that the defendant does not 
testify, nor should this fact be discussed by you or enter into your 
deliberations in any way. 
16 
(R., p.115; see Tr., p.663, Ls.9-17.) 
Because the evidence here presented a close question for the jury, the district 
court's curative instruction was insufficient to cure the prejudicial effect of the indirect 
comment on Mr. Johnson's invocation of the right to remain silent. As discussed above, 
this is not a case where the prosecution presented overwhelming evidence of 
Mr. Johnson's guilt. Considering the overall weakness of the evidence against 
Mr. Johnson, the indirect comment on his assertion of the right to remain silent, which 
implied his guilt, affected the jury's guilty verdict. Further, the curative instruction 
focused on the right to remain silent during trial, while Ms. Leonard's silence occurred 
during interrogation. Thus, the district court's curative instruction was insufficient to 
cure the prejudicial effect of the evidence of Ms. Leonard's invocation of the right to 
remain silent. 
In sum, the prosecutor's indirect comment on Mr. Johnson's assertion of the right 
to remain silent contributed to the jury's guilty verdict because of the overall weakness 
of the evidence against Mr. Johnson, and the district court's curative instruction was 
insufficient to cure the indirect comment's prejudicial effect. Thus, the State will be 
unable to be unable to demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the prosecutorial 
misconduct did not contribute to the jury's verdict. 
Because the prosecutor committed misconduct and the misconduct was not 
harmless error, the district court should have granted Mr. Johnson's motion for a 
mistrial. The district court therefore committed reversible error when it denied the 
motion for a mistrial. Mr. Johnson should be granted a new trial. 
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11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Fifteen 
Years, With Three Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Johnson Following His Conviction For Felony 
Possession Of A Controlled Substance With The Intent To Deliver 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Johnson asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed 
his sentence because his unified sentence of fifteen years, with three years fixed, is 
excessive considering any view of the facts. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively 
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record 
giving "due regard to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the 
protection of the public interest." State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence." State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Mr. Johnson does not allege that his sentence exceeds the 
statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Johnson 
must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive 
considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or objectives of criminal 
punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public 
generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for 
wrongdoing. Id. An appellate court, "[w]hen reviewing the length of a sentence ... 
consider[s] the defendant's entire sentence." State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726 
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(2007). The reviewing court will "presume that the fixed portion of the sentence will be 
the defendant's probable term of confinement." Id. 
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed 
Mr. Johnson's Sentence Because The Sentence Is Excessive Considering Any 
View Of The Facts 
Mr. Johnson asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed 
his sentence because the sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts. He 
submits that the sentence imposed by the district court is excessive considering any 
view of the facts because the district court did not give adequate consideration to 
mitigating factors. 
Specifically, the district court did not adequately consider the evidence of 
Mr. Johnson's physical health. Mr. Johnson informed the presentence investigator that 
he "suffers from frequent headaches." (PSI, p.4.) Mr. Johnson's mother, Sharla 
Worthen, described the headaches in a letter to the district court: "Michael has extreme, 
chronic, debilitating headaches. Oftentimes he would be in bed all weekend. Being a 
drug addict, doctors do not prescribe [him] painkillers. Having suffered with migraines 
my whole life, you just want to give up and die." (PSI, p.26.) Adequate consideration of 
Mr. Johnson's physical health should have resulted in a lesser sentence. 
Additionally, the district court did not adequately consider Mr. Johnson's 
substance abuse problems. The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized substance 
abuse as a mitigating factor in cases where it found a sentence to be excessive. See, 
e.g., State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). Mr. Johnson has struggled with substance 
abuse problems for much of his life. At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Johnson's counsel 
told the district court that Mr. Johnson had "a significant drug issue." (Sentencing 
Tr., p.11, Ls.10-12.) Mr. Johnson described methamphetamine as his drug of choice. 
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(PSI, pp.4-5.) In the presentence questionnaire, he scored a six out of nine on the TCU 
drug-screening form. (PSI, p.5.) "Score values of 3 or greater indicate relatively severe 
drug-related problems, and correspond approximately to a DSM drug dependence 
diagnosis." (PSI, p.5.) 
Along with the instant offenses, he was convicted of felony non-narcotic drug 
possession in 1996 and felony possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
deliver in 1991. (PSI, pp.2-3.) Mr. Johnson reported he was using drugs "the whole 
time" he was on probation for the 1991 conviction. (PSI, pp.2-3.) In fact, the 1996 
conviction was for a violation of his probation for the 1991 conviction. (PSI, pp.2-3.) 
As detailed in letters to the district court from his family, Mr. Johnson's problems 
with drugs stem from his childhood. His mother, Ms. Worthen, wrote that Mr. Johnson 
was placed on Ritalin after he was diagnosed with ADD in the first grade. (PSI, p.24.) 
The diagnosing doctor indicated that the "downside of Ritalin was drug and alcohol 
addiction, stomach problems, and headaches." (PSI, p.25.) According to Ms. Worthen, 
the Ritalin changed Mr. Johnson "from an energetic, ambitious, curious little 6-year-old 
to a lazy, unenergetic little person." (PSI, p.25.) She continued: "Research regarding 
Ritalin reveals the impact on children using Ritalin ... significant long term effect[s] 
such as depression, committing suicide, lack of coping skills, long term medical effects 
such as strokes, heart, and ulcers." (PSI, p.26.) 
Mr. Johnson's father, Robert Johnson, told the court that Mr. Johnson "has 
struggled so much through the years with his drug addiction - I had hoped it was behind 
him and I still have hope that it will be." (PSI, p.28.) His younger brother, Mark 
Johnson, himself a self-described "person of addictive behaviors," also described 
Mr. Johnson's problems: "Divorce, neglect, Ritalin, use and abuse of narcotics to name 
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a few. My mother can't keep from crying whenever we speak about that Ritalin he was 
prescribed as a child." (PSI, p.30.) Adequate consideration of Mr. Johnson's substance 
abuse problems should have resulted in a lesser sentence. 
The district court also did not give adequate consideration to Mr. Johnson's 
family support. The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized support from the defendant's 
family as a mitigating factor where the court decided that a sentence was excessive. 
State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982); see State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 835 
(2011 ). As discussed above, Mr. Johnson's mother, father and brother all wrote letters 
to the district court in support of Mr. Johnson. (PSI, pp.24-28, 30.) Additionally, 
Mr. Johnson's step-father, sister, and brother-in-law wrote letters in support. (PSI, 
pp.29, 31-33.) Mr. Johnson's step-father, Scott Worthen, wrote, "I can promise whoever 
might see this that Michael will continue to have enduring and love-driven support from 
all of us, regardless and unconditionally." (PSI, p.29.) "The more he can be exposed to 
the support and positive aspects of those who are closest to him, the more likely he is to 
commit to a long-term, even permanent, life of sobriety, and leave his demons in the 
past." (PSI, p.29.) His brother-in-law, Tyler Woodland, wrote, "We sincerely hope that 
whatever Mike's penance is, that it takes him away from his valued family relationships 
for only a very short time." (PSI, p.33.) 
At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Johnson's counsel informed the district court that 
"Mr. Johnson does have family here to support him. His mom's here, his brother's here, 
sister; I haven't met his sister. But he does have some support." (Sentencing Tr., p.11, 
L.24 - p.12, L.2.) Adequate consideration of Mr. Johnson's family support should have 
resulted in a lesser sentence. 
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Because the district court did not adequately consider the above mitigating 
factors, Mr. Johnson's sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts. Thus, 
the district court abused its discretion when it imposed the sentence. Mr. Johnson's 
sentence should be reduced. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Mr. Johnson respectfully requests that this Court vacate 
his conviction and sentence, and remand his case to the district court for a new trial. 
Alternatively, Mr. Johnson respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it 
deems appropriate, or remand his case to the district court for a new 
sentencing hearing. 
DATED this 18th day of June, 2013. 
¢/ . 
BEN PATRICK MCGREEef_::::, . 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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